RELOCATE GTMO DETAINEES TO STAND TRIAL IN THE UNITED STATES
GTMO used to be a symbol of hope for human rights on the southeastern tip of communist Cuba. Now GTMO has become a focal point of disapproval both domestically and internationally. These alleged acts of civil rights violations, torture and inhumane treatment has now become a -te rrorist tool for recruitment‖ and has received severe criticism. 1 Over the last eight years, the military commissions originally ordered by President Bush in 2001, and the detention facility at GTMO, Cuba has been under intense investigation and condemnation regarding law, policy and inhumane treatment.
On 22 January 2009, President Obama signed three executive orders:
(1) The closure of the detention facility as soon as practical, and no later than 22 January 2010. It also halts (at least temporarily) all proceedings before military commissions; (2) limiting methods for interrogations of persons in U.S. custody to those listed in the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Although it provides an exception for interrogations by the FBI, stating that the FBI may continue to use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit voluntary statement and do not involve the use of force, threats, or promises; (3) establish the Special Task Force on Detainee Disposition, which is tasked with identifying lawful options for the disposition of Guantanamo detainees and others captured by the United States. This paper will argue that there is one system that would be a suitable mixture of both the military law approach and the law enforcement approach. 6 This system is called the National Security Court System (NSCS). 7 The NSCS is suitably outfitted to -correctly assess and understand the fragile stability of military law, intelligence needs, human rights obligations, and the need for justice in this hybrid war.‖ 8 The NSCS system would be separate from existing Article III federal courts and military commission process. 9 These Article III hybrid courts would co-exist with the traditional federal courts, the military commissions, and the courts-martial system. 10 This paper will provide a historical review of the issue, reveal some of the legal issues associated with detainees, and provide a suitability, feasibility and acceptability analysis in order to evaluate three separate national policies that President Obama could execute for the detention and prosecution of current and future GTMO detainees.
History of GTMO
The U.S. Naval Base, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is the oldest overseas U.S. Jun 1898 with the arrival of one Marine Battalion. 12 Years later in 1903, the CubanAmerican Treaty was established, granting the U.S. the lease of GTMO for $2,000 a month. 13 This agreement was established for the -use of coaling and naval stations only and for no other purposes.‖ 14 In 1934, the Treaty was re-negotiated for the lease to be indefinite and that Cuba will provide all lifeline support and supplies to GTMO unless both the U.S. and Cuba agreed to dissolve it. 15 In 1964, the new Castro regime decided that the Treaty was coerced by the U.S. and would no longer be recognized by Cuba.
Castro cut off all life line support and supplies to GTMO, forcing the U.S. to construct its own infrastructure and provide supplies to make GTMO self-sufficient. 16 In 1959, Castro stated that GTMO should be returned to Cuba triggering restrictions that all U.S.
personnel will remain in GTMO only and will not enter Cuban territory. At the same time, Operation Sea Signal began and GTMO stood up JTF-160, which provided humanitarian assistance to over 50,000 Cuban immigrants attempting to flee to the U.S. and awaiting repatriation back to Cuba. 25 Again, the conditions were very poor leading to suicides and disorder within the tent city. 26 Riots were the norm, battled back by U.S. troops in full riot gear with -fixed bayonets‖. 27 Some Cubans even succeeded in scaling razor wire attempting to re-enter back to Cuba or climbing down 40-foot cliffs attempting to swim a mile back to Cuba. 28 In January 1995, the Eleventh cannot afford to risk the possibility that future detainees will be found innocent by a system that is not suitably designed to manage and synthesize the complexity of constitutional rights for terrorists. It is difficult for a civilian court to -a ssess and understand the fragile stability of military law, intelligence needs, human rights obligations, and the need for justice in this hybrid war.‖ 37 This case (Ahmed Ghailani) highlighted the challenges of affording full constitutional protections to terrorism suspects who were once held in secret detention overseas and subjected to harsh interrogation tactics by US intelligence officials. 38 Administration critics cited the shaky, one-count verdict as proof that Al Qaeda suspects should face trial at Guantánamo rather than in US courts. Others analysts have pointed to the Ghailani verdict as an example of the resilience and essential fairness of the US justice system. 39 US District Judge Lewis Kaplan, the judge in Ghailani's case stated that he, Rejected requests by defense lawyers for leniency in recognition of Ahmed Ghailani's alleged mistreatment during harsh US interrogations. Instead, the judge imposed the maximum sentence on the 36-year-old Tanzania national. Whatever the level of Ghailani's suffering, it -p ales in comparison to the suffering and the horror he and his confederates caused,‖ the judge told a packed Manhattan courtroom, according to the Associated Press.
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The sufferings Judge Kaplan was referring to is the alleged torture and being detained for years before being tried. Though Judge Kaplan's statement is palatable to most Americans, it suggests an equivalent retaliation -Tit-for-Tat‖ philosophy versus a legal philosophy. This can be very dangerous, because in future trials other judges can put the equivalent retaliation philosophy aside and focus strictly on the law. Judges in federal courts generally have no experience in correctly -ass essing and understanding the fragile stability of military law, intelligence needs, human rights obligations, and the need for justice in this hybrid war.‖
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In addition to the alleged torture of detainees, there have been complaints of violating the detainee's -wr it of habeas corpus‖ rights-detainees held at GTMO for years -prev entive detention‖, and have not either been released or put on trial.
The definition of the habeas corpus rights is:
A writ of habeas corpus is a summons with the force of a court order, addressed to the custodian (a prison official for example) demanding that a prisoner be taken before the court, and that the custodian present proof of authority, allowing the court to determine if the custodian has lawful authority to detain the person. If the custodian does not have authority to detain the prisoner, then he must be released from custody. The prisoner, or another person acting on his or her behalf, may petition the court, or a judge, for a writ of habeas corpus.
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One possible solution for the U.S. to overcome the writ of habeas corpus argument is to establish a new policy or law that all detainees placed in -pre ventive detention‖ must be -released upon the cessation of hostilities and will not have habeas corpus rights.‖ 43 It must be conveyed that this is in the best interest of national security and is conforming to the -no n-traditional warfare‖ of the twenty-first century-hybrid war.
Additionally, there have been no known cases thrown out due to violating any detainee's habeas corpus rights, which concludes that this right does not pertain for possible international terrorists.
The following sections provide three separate policies for the detention and prosecution of current and future detainees at GTMO. The three separate policies are;
( Court System. Granted all three options are viable, yet some come with more risk than others to domestic and international criticism and the interest of U.S. national security.
These options also vary with the legal systems' ability to cope with today's armed conflict of the twenty-first century, shattering all previous notions of -tr aditional warfare‖.  Hold the -pre ventive detainees‖ in separate facilities; keeping them away from detainees that may be released or awaiting trial. This prevents interaction between the three categories of detainees and eliminates potential recruits.
 GTMO can continue to release detainees per the current criteria process.
 There should be several cases being tried concurrently to ensure trials are executed in a timely manner.
 All supporting efforts are currently located at GTMO, which allows the process to resume quickly and efficiently by implementing stricter guidance, direction and civilian oversight.
 GTMO is a suitable location; it is an isolated and secure area containing numerous hard structures coupled with a well-trained and experience security force.
 GTMO's location will attract less media coverage than in the U.S.
 U.S. citizens will feel safer if trials were conducted at GTMO, rather in their own cities, thus eliminating potential terrorist incidents by extremists or protestors.
Acceptability
The domestic and international community will be less likely to oppose and international community that they will be treated in the same humane manner as U.S. prisoners would be.
The American Bar Association believes that Article III courts are the preferred forum for trying detainees accused of criminal responsibility for the 9/11 attacks on the United States. We acknowledge that the president, the attorney general and the Department of Justice have discretion to determine whether to prosecute these alleged terrorists in federal court or before a military commission. The administration's decision to prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other alleged terrorists in federal court are a sound one that the American Bar Association fully supports.
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Category III (transferred or released to a third country) detainees will continue to be handled in the same manner as before. The U.S. has already released 585 detainees to foreign countries and has recently instituted an agreement with the international world that there will be diplomatic assurances that a detainee, once released, will be treated humanely by foreign governments accepting the transfer. 55 Domestic and international legal requirements may constrain the ability of the U.S. to transfer persons to foreign countries if they might face torture of other forms of persecution. Most notably, Article 3 of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and its implementing legislation prohibit the transfer of persons to countries where there are substantial grounds of believing (i.e., it would be -m ore likely than not') that they would be subjected to torture. The Bush Administration took the position that CAT Article 3 and its implementing legislation did not cover the transfer of foreign persons held outside the U.S. in the war on terror. DoD has stated that, -i t is the policy of the United States, consistent with the approach taken by the United States in implementing …(CAT), not to repatriate or transfer GTMO detainees to other countries where it believes it is more likely than not that they will be tortured. When the transfer of a GTMO detainee is deemed appropriate, the U.S. seeks diplomatic assurances that the person will be treated humanely by the foreign government accepting the transfer.
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This action of -c hecks and balances‖ now displays true concern for foreign policy and the interest of justice. 
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Category I detainees determined not to stand trial will be placed in -p reventive detention‖ to prevent them from returning to the battlefield. They will be sent to the U.S.
for detention and will be released upon the cessation of hostilities. 59 are back on the battlefield conducting terrorist acts. 71 Granted, taking everything into account, the U.S. may have had an inclination that some of the 61 would continue terrorist acts, yet it is very difficult to prove or convince to a foreign country that a detainee will continue to conduct terrorist acts. Additionally, there have been cases of detainees that returned to foreign countries which have been unlawfully detained and or tortured. The U.S. has established the domestic and international requirements to restore this issue. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the U.S. has established:
Article 3 of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and its implementing legislation prohibit the transfer of persons to countries where there are substantial grounds of believing (i.e., it would be -m ore likely than not') that they would be subjected to torture.
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For over eight years, the U.S. has been under attack by domestic and international governments for abuse and inhumane treatment. If the U.S. can effectively implement the (Article 3 CAT) it will codify that the U.S. is exhausting every means possible to comply with foreign policy and the interest of justice.
Risks
The risks for Category 1 may raise a concern of unnecessary detention from human rights organizations and international/domestic governments. The debate whether to release, prosecute or just hold on to detainees can be very challenging for the U.S. However, the new policy to void the habeas corpus rights of detainees in this hybrid war must justify to the domestic and international world why these detainees are being held, yet not being prosecuted or released.
The risks for the category 2 detainees could surface like in the case of Ahmed
Ghalfan. The U.S. attempted to try him in federal courts, yet since allegations of torture to attain confessions or testimony against him, key evidence against him was thrown out by a Federal Judge.
The first GTMO detainee Ahmed Ghalfan was convicted in civilian court on one count of conspiring to destroy buildings and property in the 1998 terrorist bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Expect conservatives to make much of Ghailani being acquitted on hundreds of other charges, but he still faces 20 years to life in prison. 73 But because of the unusual circumstances of Mr. Ghailani's case after he was captured in Pakistan in 2004, he was held for nearly five years in a so-called black site run by the Central Intelligence Agency and at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the prosecution faced significant legal hurdles getting his case to trial and then winning the conviction. Prosecutors suffered a major setback when the judge, Lewis A. Kaplan of Federal District Court, barred them from using an important witness against Mr. Ghailani because the government had learned about the man through Mr. Ghailani's interrogation while he was in C.I.A. custody, where his lawyers say he was tortured. 74 If a trial of the five alleged plotters becomes a platform for propagandizing by Al Qaeda members, or veers off course in an unexpected way, Obama is likely to be blamed. In the meantime, the administration must be prepared to communicate with angry family members of the 911 victims and fully explain that bringing the detainees to US soil is in the best interest of justice. Without a well trained and knowledgeable court system, danger in the statement below may arise.
This is all going to be about water boarding and talking about how they were tortured. Their lawyers are going turn these people into victims and will shift the focus to the treatment the defendants received, rather than the crimes they are alleged to have committed. 75 The risks for Category 3 detainees are minimal. When the transfer of a GTMO detainee is deemed appropriate, the U.S. seeks diplomatic assurances that the person will be treated humanely by foreign government accepting the transfer from the -Articl e 3 CAT.‖ 76 This Article should prevent torture and unlawful detention of GTMO detainees being released to third countries and abides with U.S.'s policy and values.
 OPTION 3: NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM
While numerous U.S. policies were put forth by President Obama, it is vital to shift the debate on detention operations. To date, the promotion has essentially been separated into two sides:
(1) Those who view the conflict with al-Qaeda as requiring a law enforcement response and thus civilian courts and the due process ordinarily accorded U.S. citizens; and (2) those who view the conflict as an armed conflict, believing the law of war paradigm to be appropriate for handling the detainees. Unfortunately, neither solution is working effectively. To say the least, this is an extremely difficult problem to address. This new armed conflict of the twenty-first century has shattered all previous notions of traditional warfare. Thus, neither paradigm fits neatly. Components of each paradigm are ideal to implement while others could never be successfully applied in the context of the al-Qaeda detainees. 77 The rare environment of this conflict requires a unique temperament. Not only is the war itself a story, -but the al-Qaeda fighters are unique as well-neither warrior nor criminal.‖ 78 Combining the use of the military commissions and the use of Article III courts it is feasible and a practical solution in adjusting to the changing environment. 79 The detention and adjudication of these individuals needs to be similarly tailored to the current circumstances by utilizing a court that neither embraces the law enforcement model or the law of war model, but rather a hybrid of these two prevailing paradigms.
Suitability
The NSCS will be a court dedicated to hear cases of international terrorism and recommend a reasonable sensible solution from the problem the Obama administration has inherited. This method must and can act solely to attain, -just ice, deterrence, abide to human rights responsibility, and provide civil liberties protections and maintain the support of our international partners, and gains national consensus.‖ 81 The system created would be separate from existing Article III federal courts and military commission process. These Article III hybrid courts would co-exist with the traditional federal courts, the military commissions, and the courts-martial system. 82 The U.S. already has specialized courts in the federal system of particularly complex issues requiring unique knowledge, including bankruptcy, patents, copyrights, taxation, and international trade. The U.S. has ample precedent for a security-oriented court dedicated to complicated issues requiring the development of substantive and procedural expertise. 83 As the environment changes and stake holders shift domestically and internationally, so must strategic policy. 84 Technology, media, human rights, and domestic and international opinion have become a very powerful tool to apply pressure to acts of injustice or inhumane treatment. This policy must be transparent globally and articulate to the international world and a human rights group that not only does this provides a fair and speedy due process; it also ensures national security is not degraded. To codify such a scheme would be to essentially bring the numerous GTMO problems into the U.S. The presumption should be to try all detainees captured. For those detainees who the President or military determine cannot (or should not) be tried for various reasons must be reserved as the exception to the norm rather than being an integral part of the any new system. 90 The Department of Justice (DOJ), vice Department of Defense (DoD) should head up this system and watch over all prosecutions. 91 This will eliminate the perception of command influence which has been raised in the past by both the defense and prosecution teams. 92 -H aving civilian oversight by Article III judges will send a strong signal of change.‖ 93 The NSCS must have jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and non U.S. citizens, because it is critical not to discriminate when treating al-Qaeda detainees. 94 It is important to note point that:
Persons subject to the court, regardless of citizenship, are those alleged to be current or former members of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups that engaged or plan to engage in acts of international terrorism. Congress needs to clarify that the NSCS's jurisdiction does not cover -an y terrorist,‖ but only those who engage in international terrorism. This removes the fear of some that the court would have jurisdiction over any group or entity that engages in terrorism. The limited jurisdiction of the NSCS would serve as a check on any arbitrary use of the court system. 95 To ensure that the right judges are placed with appropriate expertise, the NSCS will be chaired with -l ife-tenured‖ Article III judges with law of armed conflict proficiency. 96 The appointment of these nine federal judges will be conducted in the same manner as any other federal judge. 97 Due to national security and interests, there will be no juries for these trials. It will consist of a three-judge panel with a two-to-one vote. -There will be two panels running consecutively, with the out of rotation judges handling any appeals.‖ 98 However, these judges must have the background to -determine the legality of intelligence gathering, terrorist surveillance and other necessary areas regarding terrorism and national security.‖ 99 As Andy McCarthy (former federal prosecutor) states:
Judges hearing cases within the existing federal criminal justice system tend to elevate individual rights at the expense of public safety (which is to say, at the expense of public's collective rights). When opportunities for creativity present themselves-which frequently happens due to a pervasive elasticity in the rules governing judicial proceedings, over which judges have a degree of supervisory authority-judges are hard wired to err on the side of providing more process.
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Mr. McCarthy's concern is understandable, because in the criminal justice system, the risk is not as excessive as it is with national security.
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The prosecutors will be earmarked by the Department of Justice National Security Division and would act for and prosecute for the government which will ensure that experienced and specific civilian -pra ctitioners‖ would handle these very important has instituted other agencies since 9/11, yet it has failed to implement an effective legal system.
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Strategically we have created the Department of Homeland Security, broken the wall between the CIA and FBI intelligence arms, and created the Director of National Intelligence. Tactically, we have applied the surge in Iraq-and now in Afghanistan-by using new methods to carry out the war(s). It seems logical that we now must update our legal regime to best meet the relatively new threat of international terror posed by al-Qaeda and likeminded affiliates. 108 The U.S. has released a list of possible U.S. military bases that could be used to house detainees-Camp Pendleton, CA; Fort Leavenworth, MO, and Marine Air Station, CA. These facilities can detain up to 250 detainees providing state of the art security, coupled with highly trained and supervised security personnel. 109 There could be two options in manning these facilities: (1) use military correctional specialists who are already certified in this Military Occupational Specialty (MOS); (2) use the units that have already conducted detention operations or will be designated to conduct detention operations at GTMO. Either way, there will be highly trained and supervised security element to man and equip for this mission. 110 
Risks
There are minimal risks to this option. However, to establish this option, a separate institution solely dedicated to the National Security Court System must be stood up. Is the U.S. willing to concede budgeting for this Court System, while GTMO is already in place and the millions of dollars already vested for the Military Commissions in GTMO? Additionally, in a case like Ahmed Ghalfan's, since he was held at GTMO for such a long period of time and allegations of torture to attain confessions or testimony against him, key evidence was thrown out by a Federal Judge. 111 The NSCS must determine policy and procedures to handle such cases, however in past cases, all detainees on trial have been convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
However, for all future detainees straight from the battlefield, NSCS will provide a sound and effective judicial system. This will ensure that the sole focus of the trial will be alleged acts of terrorism, not due process and torture. 112 
Recommendation
It is recommended that the National Security Court System be implemented.
Several options are being considered by the Obama Administration, which include the continued use of the military commissions, as well as use of Article III courts. However, neither the military law style or the law enforcement style, respectively, -are properly equipped to appropriately strike the delicate balance of military law, intelligence needs, human rights obligations, and the need for justice in this hybrid war.‖ 113 A third approach--a court dedicated to hear cases of international terrorism is needed, the -National Security Court System‖. 114 -Legislatively customized to meet the rare nature of the current conflict, the National Security Court System not only addresses the hybrid
